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TAKING AND PERCEIVING

BY

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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled Taking and Perceiving, submitted by Gordon Weese in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the thesis is to examine the roles of taking and sensible taking in Roderick Chisholm's definitions of perceiving and the criteria of evidence. The term, "perceive", is examined in its propositional and nonpropositional senses. In one sense perceiving entails taking. The definition of the locution, "S takes x to be f", is considered as it relates to the state of S. An explanation of the locution in intentional terms is given. Taking is compared to the concepts of believing and inferring. The role of appearing and sensing terminology in perceiving is described. There is a sense in which "S takes x to be f" is not implied by perceiving. The empirical and taking criteria are described and reasons given for rejecting their adequacy as evidence. The sensible taking criterion of evidence is introduced and compared to remembering and good taking criteria. A theory of evidence needed to establish suitable marks by which the adequacy of statements of evidence can be judged is suggested. The state of S when he cites the empirical and sensible taking criteria as adequate evidence is evaluated in the light of three marks of adequate evidence.

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CHAPTER I

TAKING

A. TAKING IN TWO KINDS OF PERCEPTUAL STATEMENTS

When a man looks through some trees and sees his friend's house there, he is not likely to say anything more than "I see Gene's house". However, when a man sees a house through the trees, he does see a house there, he has adequate evidence for a proposition that a house is there, and he takes what is appearing to him in a certain way. The man, S, may be said to be perceiving something to have such-and-such a characteristic. "S perceives something, x, to have characteristic, f" may be defined as follows:

There is an x which is f and which appears in some way to S: S takes x to be f; and S has adequate evidence for the proposition that x is f.¹

This is the meaning of "perceive" in the most important of its senses, the propositional sense. Corresponding definitions of "hear", "smell", "see", "touch", and "taste" may be constructed by making use of the definiens of the definition "perceive" above and altering it appropriately. If we take the sentence, "I see Gene's house" propositionally,

¹R. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 3. Hereafter referred to as Perceiving.

it may be expressed "I see that that is Gene's house". We may now assume that the speaker sees a house which is appearing to him in such a way that he takes it to be Gene's house and he has adequate evidence that it is Gene's house.

It is apparent that we sometimes do not make it clear whether or not a perceptual statement is to be taken propositionally or not. Our original observation, "I see Gene's house", may not be meant to have a proposition as the object of the verb "see". If so this sentence would be an example of the form, "S perceives x", the simplest of the nonpropositional senses of "perceive".

S perceives x means: x appears in some way to S and S takes x to have some characteristic.¹

When someone uses a perception verb in the nonpropositional sense, the grammatical object refers to something that is appearing in some way to him and he takes it to be some way. For S to declare that he is touching the table when he intends this touching the table in the nonpropositional sense, he implies the table is appearing to him in some way and he is taking the table to have some characteristic.

Nonpropositional perception statements are unclear in another way. In themselves they do not clearly state what the perceiver takes to be the case. The statement, "Elsie sees a salesman talking" may mean that the man whom

¹Ibid., pp. 149f.

Elsie sees, unknown to Elsie, is a salesman. But it may also mean the same as "Elsie sees that the man is a salesman and that he is talking". There is no paradox in saying that an observer sees a book but does not take it to be a book. We may want to say that he sees a book but does not take it to be a book. We may not want to say, however, that he sees a book without taking it to be anything at all. Denials of nonpropositional statements are sometimes ambiguous, too. When a child is looking for his mitten, we may exclaim, "He is looking at his mitten but he does not see it". Here we may conclude that the thing for which he is looking is the thing at which he is looking but it is not the thing which he takes to be the thing for which he is looking.¹ There is a further distinction which should be made when we use perception words nonpropositionally in the first and third persons. Although we can say that Elsie sees a salesman without taking the man to be a salesman, Elsie herself cannot say, "I see a salesman without realizing it". A first-person nonpropositional perception statement in the present tense entails the subject's taking something to have a certain characteristic. But this is not true when this type of statement refers to past or future time. Elsie could say "I saw a salesman", or "I shall see a salesman" without presupposing that she took the thing she saw or will take what she

¹Vid., ibid., on verbs which ordinarily designate activities like "watch", "look at", "listen", "sniff", "savour", and footnote #27, p. 166.

will see to be a salesman.

Some perceptual statements seem to be both propositional and nonpropositional in form. Upon analysis, though, they fall into one or the other category. The sentence, "Elsie sees the man who is selling bathwater", for example, turns out to be a nonpropositional perception statement. The propositional clause, "who is selling bathwater" is not itself the object of the verb, "sees", but modifies the substantive "man", the nonpropositional object of the verb. Thus, it should be treated as a sentence of the nonpropositional variety. We can assume that Elsie's seeing the man does not entail her taking the man to be a salesman. Now consider the statement, "Elsie sees that the man is a salesman". Since the propositional clause, "That the man is a salesman", in this statement, in contrast to the propositional clause in the above sentence, is the object of the verb, we classify the use of "sees" in the sentence as propositional. We may infer that Elsie perceives the man and that she perceives that he is a salesman. That is, Elsie takes the thing she is seeing both to be a man and to be a salesman. In general,

Whenever we can say, "S perceives that x is f" or "S perceives x to be f", we can infer "S perceives x" and "S perceives f".¹

¹Ibid., p. 164.

We cannot infer the converse, however. From the truth of the statements, "S perceives x" and "S perceives f" we cannot infer that "S perceives that x is f" is true. Although Elsie sees a man, and she sees someone selling something, we cannot conclude that the man she sees is a salesman. It is also the case, as we have said, that Elsie, herself, may see a man but not take him to be a salesman.

B. THE DEFINITION OF TAKING

When a man looks through the trees and sees his friend's house, we understand that the relation between his taking the house in some way and his perceiving the house depends on whether a perceptual sentence expressing his observation is in a propositional or a nonpropositional form. We also know that in both uses of "see" a subject, S, takes something, x, to have some characteristic, f.¹ Chisholm suggests that the statement, "S takes x to be f" means:

S believes (T1) that x's being f is a causal condition of the way he is being appeared to and (T2) that there are possible ways of varying x which would cause concomitant variations in the way he is appeared to.²

This definition of what is prima facie a simple aspect of perceiving seems overly complex. Would not a subject's

¹Let us understand the symbol, f, to represent a certain characteristic when a propositional perception statement is being used and some, perhaps unspecified, characteristic when a nonpropositional perception statement is employed.

²Ibid., p. 77; note that the symbols, T1 and T2, are mine.

merely believing that a house is appearing to him be an adequate meaning of "taking"? Chisholm points out that this will not suffice because he wishes to describe "appear" in terms of "certain causal concepts of physics and physiology".¹ A subject's taking something to be a house, given this sense of "appear", would imply his believing certain physical and physiological laws.

"Taking" and Believing T1

To define "taking", then, must both T1 and T2 be included? What would be an analysis of the state of S if his taking included only T1? To answer the latter question let us suppose that S hears some sounds from the city coming through his office window which remind him of a previous experience. As a consequence, he pictures the trees near his cottage on a windy day. In this reverie he may hear the creaking sound of the wind in the branches regardless of the fact that none of the things he hears appear creaking to him. Yet it is because of the sounds that he hears at his window that S is appeared to in a creaking way. We can say truly that the sounds of the city causally condition his creaking appearance and that the sounds outside his window that stimulate his ears appear creaking. If taking entails only believing T1, then one may believe that sense impressions

¹Ibid., p. 149. I will deal neither with causation nor with these concepts; for some discussion vid., ibid., pp. 143 - 149.

are not different from internal occurrences like reveries and visions. In this state S confuses sense impressions with ideas and images.

There is a way in which S may distinguish the appearing of impressions from the appearing of images. There is a regularity about the impressions of sense which is not characteristic of images. If S were listening to the city's noise, what would appear to him would be at least in part because of the sounds he is hearing. If the sounds were not coming to him in that way but in a different way, he would at least in part be appeared to in a different way. The same cannot be said of images, however. Though S is sensing sounds in a different way he may have a change in his images or he may have the same images occurring to him. By making changes in the stimuli--closing the window, waiting until the noon whistle blows, or turning on the fan--S can make regular changes in the way in which the auditory stimulus appears to him. But it is not the case that by altering the environment in these simple ways S can easily produce systematic changes in his imagery. Even though he turns the fan switch, he may continue to imagine the sound of the wind in the branches of the trees at the site of his cottage. To make himself call up one image, then another, and then the first image again, he will probably have to do more than merely turn the switch of the fan.¹ We may conclude that when S believes T2 as

¹Subjecting himself to brainwashing treatment, psychoanalytic examination, or other techniques of suggestion would be more appropriate.

well as T1, his state is such that he takes an appearance which is the result of a sense impression to be conditioned by an impression and not by an image. In order for S to distinguish impressions of the senses from images and ideas, something like T2 is required.

"Taking" and Believing T2

It is apparent that a definition of "taking" should include believing T2--that variations in a stimulus cause systematic changes in the way a stimulus appears to a subject. But perhaps believing T2 is all that is needed in a definition of "taking". If so, the answer to the first question--Must both T1 and T2 be included in order to define "taking"?--will be given. Let us see what the state of S would be if "taking" were defined simply as believing T2. Taking a pen to be smooth would mean believing that touching the side and then touching the engraving on the pen would result in the perceiver's being appeared to in a smooth and then a pitted way.

Let us suppose that the sentence, "Garth takes the pen to be smooth" means "Garth believes that there are possible ways of varying the pen which would cause concomitant variations in the smooth way he is appeared to." Suppose Garth is handling the pen: he touches the trademark engraved on the side and then he touches the side. When he touches the trademark, let us say he is appeared to pitted; when he rubs his hand against the side, he is appeared to

smooth. Changes in the position of the pen in relation to Garth's hands have been accompanied by the ways in which he is appeared to changing from pitted to smooth. Our problem is to determine whether the belief that changes in the pen's position cause corresponding changes from pitted to smooth in the way the pen appears to Garth could be the meaning of the statement, "Garth takes the pen to be smooth".

As it stands, the belief is not stated clearly. Changes in the pen's position could mean that the pen is placed on the desk and then is put in the perceiver's pocket. This certainly is not what is intended if the "changes in the pen's position" refers to Garth's moving the pen in his hands so that he touches the surface of the pen. To make this description of the situation conform to what Garth is doing, let us understand that the words "changes in the pen's position" refer to changes in the parts of the surface of the pen--the engraving, the side--which Garth touches with his fingers.¹

¹As we shall see, this interpretation of the words, "changes in the pen's position" is significant for Chisholm's understanding of the object of perception; the object is called the "proper stimulus" and changes in the object are a function of the degree of stimulation, infra, pp. 39 - 43. We might say that the expression, "changes in the pen's position" could read "changes in the portions of the pen's surface touched" or "touching the engraving and then the side". Neither of these alterations will be adopted--the first because it is too complicated and leads to confusion, cf. between the expressions "touching portions of the pen" and "touching the pen", (Perceiving, pp. 154f.) and the second because it seems at this stage in our study to depart too much from the original statement of T2.

Now we wish to know whether a belief that variations in the pen cause concomitant variations in its appearing pitted and then appearing smooth constitutes taking the pen to be smooth. This belief appears to resemble the belief that changes in the colour of the chameleon cause changes in the ways it appears to us. If we had this belief about the changes in the chameleon affecting changes in the way we see it, we would not take the chameleon to have one colour only. We would probably take the chameleon to have several colours or to change its colour. Take the example of Garth. Let us suppose that he does hold the belief that changes in the pen cause the pen's appearing to him pitted and then appearing to him smooth. Would he say that he takes the pen to be smooth? He is more likely to say that the pen is pitted and smooth or that the pen has an irregular surface or even that it is not smooth. Suppose Garth touches two places on the pen both of which are smooth but one is less smooth than the other. Let us also imagine that he believes that changes in the pen cause the pen to appear to him less smooth and then smooth. We could imagine Garth's taking the pen in several ways but the taking that concerns us is his taking the pen to be smooth. Whether Garth takes the pen to be smooth depends on how much change there has been in the way the pen appears to him. If Garth feels that there has been only slight variations in the smooth appearances, he would take the pen to be smooth. If, on the other hand, the changes

in his tactile impressions have undergone considerable change, say from bumpy impressions to glossy impressions, he probably would not take the pen to be smooth. If Garth's feeling that he is being appeared to more or less smooth results in his taking the pen to be smooth, his belief that changes in the pen causes the pen's appearing more or less smooth would be all that is needed for him to take the pen to be smooth. We would be able to say, then, that a belief of this kind--a belief that T2--constitutes the meaning of "taking".

Let us take a closer look at these slight variations in the way the pen appears. The first sense impression, let us say, is less smooth. If this were the only sense impression, the pen would, presumably, be taken to be less than smooth, that is, not quite what the perceiver would call smooth but closer to smooth than any other tactile impression. If the perceiver did not have any new tactile impression in touching the pen, he would take the pen to be almost smooth or smooth but not perfectly smooth. Although he would not take the pen not to be smooth, he would not take the pen to be smooth either. Now let us say that the perceiver has another tactile impression which is unrelated to the first one. This impression is smooth. When he is appeared to smooth, we know that he takes the pen to be smooth. If these were entirely separate takings, the first would be that the pen is not quite smooth and the second that the pen is

smooth. In the first case the perceiver would not take the pen to be smooth and in the second he would take the pen to be smooth. In the first case, though, he certainly would not take the pen not to be smooth. This separation of the two appearances serves to point out the importance of the word "changes" in the belief that changes in the object cause changes in the ways the object appears to someone. If these changes in the way that an object appears are so slight that they appear merely as slight shifts in one characteristic of the object, the perceiver may take the object to have this characteristic. When these changes in the way an object appears differ sufficiently for the object to appear to have two characteristics to the perceiver, he will not take the object to have only one characteristic.

Our question about Garth can now be answered. The question was "Is his belief (that changes in the pen cause corresponding changes from pitted to pointed appearances to him) the meaning of his taking the pen to be smooth?" The pitted and smooth appearances, prima facie, fall into the second category: the change from a pitted appearing to a smooth appearing is so extensive that Garth would not take the pen to be smooth. Suppose, though, the pitted appearing is an almost-smooth appearing to Garth. In touching the pen Garth would be appeared to almost smooth and then he would be appeared to smooth. There has been only a slight variation in the way the pen appears. Now the pitted and smooth

appearings belong to the first category. The changes in the way Garth is appeared to are so minimal that Garth may take the pen to be smooth.

This reply to the question about Garth can be put in terms which will bring us to the relation between believing T2 and taking in the definition of "taking". We set out to determine whether T2--believing that variations in x cause concomitant variations in the way x appears to S--is in itself an adequate definition of "taking". The conclusion is that believing T2 is by itself the definition of "taking" provided that the changes in the way an object appears to a perceiver are small. The changes in the way something appears must be the result of variations in a single characteristic of the object. With this important qualification on the variations in the way x appears, the definition of taking would be

"S takes x to be f" means "S believes T2"

If the changes in the way an object appears are not of this kind, believing T2 in itself does not constitute the definition of "taking".

Believing T2 Implies Believing T1

We have seen that when a perceiver believes T2 where the term, "variations" is used in the sense of slight modifications in a characteristic of an object and corresponding slight variations in the way the thing appears to a perceiver, believing T2 constitutes the definition of "taking". Let us

look at this definition again to see whether the locution, "S believes T1", is needed when the locution, "S takes x to be f" is defined this way. Let us proceed by determining whether a perceiver could believe T2 without believing T1. That is, could someone believe that a changing appearance is the result of changes in the object and not assume that a characteristic of the object is a causal condition of the way the object is appearing to him?

To illuminate the possibility let us consider the colours of a sunset. If the sunset appears yellow then pink, we believe that changes in the way the sunset appears is a consequence of variations in the way the sunlight reflects from particles in the atmosphere. Could we accept that changes from yellow to pink in the way the sunset appears is a consequence of variations in the reflected sunlight and not at the same time accept that the reflected sunlight does not cause the yellow or is not a causal condition of the pink? The answer will be clear from the following conversation between Charlie and Susie who are watching a sunset:

C: Do you see the yellow changing to pink?

S: Yes, what a pale yellow that is!

C: What pale yellow? I only see colours changing.

S: What? Don't you see that rosy pink?

C: Are you imagining things, Susie? All I see are the variations of the colours in the sky.

Let us assume that our two watchers are not hallucinating,

and that their sensory organs and nervous systems are functioning normally and that they are reporting their observations veridically. We would want to ask Charlie whether the sunset appears pink to him. If he, as we suppose, would reply to the effect that he simply sees the sunset changing to pink, we might ask him whether he believes that the sky is pink when the colour changes into pink. If he denies this, then he is guilty of making a statement like "The sky has turned pink but I do not believe that it is pink". Charlie is guilty of contradicting himself. Allegedly he is being appeared to in a certain way and he believes that a change in an object has caused a change in the way he is appeared to. However, he does not believe that the object causes the way he is being appeared to. The belief that changes in objects bring about changes in the way an object appears entails the belief that the object causes the way it appears. We can say that in the definition of "taking" T2 entails T1. It is not logically possible for S to believe that changes in an object cause alterations in the way it is appearing to him without believing that the object is a causal condition of the ways it appears.¹

¹Conceptualizing bears a close resemblance to taking. Some concept of an experience-content seems to accompany the way in which an object appears. We might ask whether S would take x to be f without naming or describing an appearing in any way at all. Take a situation in which S claims to smell something while at the same time he claims not to have any idea of the smell. It is easy to confuse the two locutions, "I smell but I cannot describe the smell", and

If T1 is implied in the statement of T2, it would seem redundant to include T1 in the definition of the locution "S takes x to be f". This, of course, is not so. It is easily seen that when the locution is defined merely as "S believes T2" the perceiver can take x to be f only in those instances where possible small variations of x are causing variations in the way x appears to him. When the locution is defined this way, S could not take x to be f when no changes at all are taking place in the object. Since we would want a definition of taking to encompass those experiences of taking when the object is not varying as it is being perceived, and experiences like hallucinations and

"I smell but there is no possible description that I or anyone else could give for it". In the first locution he is unable because of his lack of sense discrimination, the weakness of the odour, or his present limitation of vocabulary. There is no suggestion that he under other circumstances or someone else now under the same conditions could not conceptualize the smell. In the second locution, he is claiming that no human being can possibly conceive of his olfactory sensing. Assuming that he is not referring to the privacy of his own experience, we would not know what to make of this claim. We would not readily say that he is sensing at all. We would not want to say that he takes an odiferous object to have a characteristic if he or anyone else can have no idea of the way he is being appeared to. Suppose he holds to the second locution insisting that he is smelling. Expressing himself in the adjectival form he would say "I am being appeared to but there is no possible conception of the way". He may say that he has evidence of a kind which we cannot have. But this is trivial in the sense that we all have "our own" evidence to the degree that our sense organs are as effective as his and in the sense that it does not amount to more than the registering with us the fact that his sensory apparatus is functioning. Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, "The Intentionality of Sensation", in *Analytic Philosophy*, ed. R.J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), pp. 174f. and A.M. Quinton, "The Problem of Perception", *Mind*, LXIV (1955), p. 525.

dreams, the locution, "S believes T1", must be included in the definition of "taking". This definition, in addition, would almost entirely exclude taking phantasies, experiences like spots before the eyes, visions, and so on, to have characteristics.

"Taking": Believing T1 and T2

We are now in a better position to answer the first question posed: To define "taking" must both T1 and T2 be included? If "taking" is defined as believing T1 and not T2 there will be no way to distinguish between those appearances which are a result of things like dreams and those appearances which are caused by "physical" objects. Some ways of appearing vary in patterns similar to the ways their stimuli change, while other ways of appearing do not vary in ways corresponding to changes in stimuli. These two relations between varying ways of appearing and alterations in things causing the appearances permit us to distinguish two sources of stimulation. Where the ways of appearing vary concomitantly with changes in the source, the cause of the variations is a "physical" object and where the ways of appearing do not vary concomitantly with changes in the stimulus, what is appearing is a dream, hallucination, or other phenomena. If, on the other hand, "taking" is defined as believing T2 and not believing T1, we could take those objects which are undergoing possible slight changes to have characteristics but we would be unable to take objects which are not changing

as we are perceiving them and experiences like visions and phantasies to have characteristics. In order to define "taking" in a manner which will enable us to distinguish between sense impressions and images and to take an object which is not varying slightly as we are perceiving it to have a characteristic, the definition must include both locution T1 and locution T2.

C. "BELIEVES" IN THE DEFINITION OF "TAKING"

Knowing Entails Believing

One other portion of the definition of the locution "S takes \dot{x} to be \underline{f} " needs to be considered. This is the word, "believes" in the definiens, "S believes T1 and T2". What does it mean to believe that something is so?¹ Because the notion of belief will be referred to later, let us consider here the use of the term, "believes" in propositional statements like "S believes T1 and T2".

The term, "believes" may be compared to the term, "know". When we know that what we smell is bacon frying, we may not say that we believe that the bacon is frying. Rather we say that we smell the bacon frying. If, on the other hand, someone questions the veracity of our observation and there is some uncertainty in our mind about, say, the identity of the odour, we might say, "I take this to be the smell of bacon frying". Our friend, however, may feel that we have no doubt in our mind that it is the odour of

¹Perceiving, p. 17.

bacon that we smell. He may tell us, "You say that you believe that you smell bacon frying, but for all I know, you know that bacon is frying". We sometimes use the word, "believe" when we actually know what is the case as our friend has pointed out. The term, "believe" would not be used in this sense unless we know: believing entails knowing. In contrast, the term, "believe" may be intended to convey doubt or hesitancy, as it is in the sentence, "I believe this to be the smell of bacon frying". In this sense believing means the same as accepting or assuming.¹ When believing means accepting, knowing entails believing.²

Since taking is related to perceiving as believing is related to knowing, it is important to look at the entailment involved.³ This entailment is not like that of a species to its genus. Knowing is not related to believing as palamino is to horse. Rather knowing relates to believing as winning relates to running. Just as a track star cannot win a race unless he runs the race, one cannot know something unless one believes it. Knowing entails believing in the way in which winning entails running where winning is not a species of running. In the same sense that we might refer

¹The locution "S accepts h" where h represents the name of a proposition, statement, or hypothesis is replaceable by "S assumes that h is true", ibid., p. 16.

²Ibid., p. 17.

³Ibid., p. 76.

to belief as a condition for knowledge, we may consider taking a condition for perceiving. In propositional statements perceiving entails taking with the qualification that the relation is like that in which catching entails chasing and not that in which Siamese entails cat.¹

Taking is Described in Intentional Sentences

"Believing" in the meaning it has in the definition of "taking" has the same connotation as "accepting".² Chisolm endeavours to elucidate the term "accepting" by referring to the concept of intentionality.³ Psychological statements like those with the verbs "desiring", "believing", "seeking" and "assuming" have a property which nonpsychological statements do not have. The sentence, "The candidate expects that he will win a majority", exhibits a peculiar relation between the subject and the predicate. The relation of expectation between the candidate and his winning a majority vote holds even though his winning is not a fact--does not occur.⁴ The contradictory, "The candidate does not expect that he will win a majority", also does not imply that the candidate will win or that the candidate will not

¹Ibid., p. 18.

²"S accepts h" is replaceable by "S assumes that h is true", ibid., p. 16.

³His view expressed in Perceiving, Ch. II, has since been superseded.

⁴Ibid., p. 170.

win. The sentence, "S believes that T1", exhibits this property for "neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the propositional clause is true or false".¹

This can be readily seen by the example, "Levesque believes that Quebec is a society separate from Canada". Levesque's believing this does not imply that the statement, "Quebec is a society separate from Canada" is either true or false. Also, the sentence, "Levesque does not believe that Quebec is a society separate from Canada" says nothing about the truth or falsity of the statement, "Quebec is a society separate from Canada".

Since the definition of "taking" uses the verb "believing" we can claim that in order to describe taking we must use sentences which are intentional. Taking, like believing, is an attitude which is essentially intentional in import. Like "believing", when it has the sense of "accepting", taking is essentially intentional. The only thing that we can say about taking is that any description of it will use merely intentional sentences.²

Taking is not Inferring

We have said that to explain taking intentional

¹Ibid., p. 172.

²Note: the definition of "evidence", "unreasonable", "indifferent", and "acceptable" make use of one undefined locution, "h is more worthy of S's belief than i" where "h" and "i" represent propositions, ibid., pp. 4 - 14.

sentences like "S believes T1 and T2" must be used. This means that in taking something to have a characteristic a belief that certain conditions hold is implied. Although the truth or falsity of these conditions like T1 and T2 is not implied, the propositional clauses, T1 and T2, themselves are implied. If taking means believing T1 and T2 and believing implies T1 and T2, taking implies T1 and T2. This is not to say that "taking" is followed by propositional clauses. In the definition of "taking" it is "believing" not "taking" which precedes the propositional clauses, T1 and T2. This difference permits us to avoid viewing taking as a case of inferring.

When "taking" is followed by a propositional clause it is a clear case of inference. When a commentator says, "From the recent opinion polls, I take it that the president's popularity has fallen", he is inferring a political leader's popularity from the results of polls. In its usual sense "inferring" is taken to be what the mechanic is doing when he listens for the rattle in the auto and then "frames a hypothesis" about the source of the noise. "Unconscious inference" and "interpretation" do not do justice to what is meant by "taking" either.¹ When we hear a robin chirp, we do not deduce that the cause of our hearing the chirping is the robin's chirping. In assuming, for instance, that if we

¹Ibid., pp. 77, 158 ff.

were not hearing the chirping we would not be hearing the robin chirp, we do not mean that the proposition which we are believing is the object of deliberate inference or unconscious inference. We merely mean that if we found that the proposition was false we would be surprised. We would be obliged to revise our beliefs, especially those regarding birds and chirping sounds. Without any postulations about human experience, reflection of light waves or sensory reception, we accept the proposition. When we see that trees are green, that eyes blink and that tables are rectangular, we do not infer that these objects stimulate us so that we sense them this way. In a simple rather primitive way we perceive them. We sense them this way and we assume or believe they are this way.

Taking is not Believing Laws

Although "taking" is defined as believing certain propositions--T1 and T2--it is not a case of inference. It is not even a case of believing certain laws. For example, Chisholm does not wish to say "S believes x is appearing to him" rather than "S believes T1" because he sees that this would commit S to believing something implausible.¹ But Chisholm does define "appearing" in terms of certain physical and physiological laws. Thus, S, in taking x to be f,

¹Ibid., footnote 11, p. 77.

would seem to have a belief regarding these laws. We might ask whether the definition of "taking", namely, "S believes T1 and T2", does not involve believing certain laws about the object and the way it appears to S.

According to this view of the definitions of "taking", a man could not take flowers to be on the table unless he believes something about the way flowers appear. He would have to believe, for instance, that for his visual sense organs to register the shapes of flowers that light rays must be reflected off some flowers to his eyes. Moreover, he could not take flowers to be on the table unless he assumes something about the variations in his seeing the flowers being produced by his acting in certain ways. That is, he must believe in a certain form of the causal law in order to be able to take the flowers to be on the table. We are postulating, in effect, that a man would not take the flowers to be on the table unless he believes in the law that the way they appear is causally conditioned by their being on the table and unless he believes in the law that changing the flowers in some way causes a corresponding change in the way they appear to him.

This view of taking is as implausible as our having to believe certain things in physiology in order to understand what it means to "be appeared to". When we say that a stoplight appears red, we do not believe certain theories about visual stimulation. Similarly, when we see that a

stoplight is red, we do not believe certain physical laws about light waves and certain physiological views about sensory perception. Upon being asked what we mean by saying that we see the red light, we might say that we believe that the red light causes its appearing to us red, or that we assume that the red light would not be appearing to us unless the light were red. But these kinds of statements will be used when we try to explain what we mean by the term, "see".¹ In explaining an expression like "seeing red" we would probably say in part that we take the light to be red. If we are asked what we mean by taking something to be red, we might say something like "By 'taking it to be red' I mean that I accept that I would not be seeing red if the light were not red". Suppose we were asked whether this reply means that for us seeing implies our believing certain physical and physiological laws about light waves, and sensory stimulation. We would probably deny, first of all, that we have any sophisticated knowledge of the physiological and physical processes involved when we see a red light. We could go further than this. We could deny that an understanding of "seeing" involves a belief in any laws whatever. We merely claim that "taking" is to be defined in terms of "accepting" and that "accepting" is to be followed by those conditions which must pertain in order to give an adequate explanation

¹Cf. ibid., pp. 54 ff.

of the definiendum. Since the condition for accepting has three parts--the presence of an object, its causing a sense impression, and its appearing in some way--it must be couched in a propositional clause. Once we have those conditions which are accepted when one takes something, we are able to define taking as accepting them. Since the conditions for taking are T1 and T2, "taking" is defined as believing T1 and T2.

Taking is Believing

When perceive words occur in propositional and in nonpropositional perception statements, they mean that something is appearing to a perceiver, he has evidence for what he is perceiving and he takes the thing appearing to him in some way. This taking is not a case of inferring and it is not believing certain laws. Is this taking, which is involved when we perceive, believing or is it something else? The answer to this question, we contend, is that taking is believing where the object of the believing is something which is sensed in perceiving.

When someone perceives something to have a characteristic in the propositional use of the term, "perceive" and thus takes it to have that characteristic, he assumes or believes certain propositions about "being appeared to".¹

¹Cf., ibid., pp. 67, 75f., 159.

If someone takes something to be a police car flashing, he is being appeared to in a certain way; he believes that if he were not being appeared to in this way he would not be seeing the flashing light. In addition, he assumes that if he were to act in certain ways, say, close his eyes or stop his own car quickly, he would be appeared to in other ways, ways in which he would not be appeared to if he were not now seeing the police car's "flasher". To take something which is appearing in some way to have a characteristic is to believe at the instant that something is appearing that it has the characteristic and that it is that thing which is appearing. When we do believe these things now about an object which is appearing to us in a certain way; we say that we take the object to have the characteristic. When, on the other hand, we believe things about something which we are not immediately perceiving in this way, we do not say that we take the object in some way. In the definition of "taking", both "takes" and "believes" play the same role. "S takes x to be f" could be replaced by "S believes that x being f . . .". In both instances the object of S intention is x and the action of taking or believing is particularly concentrated on the characteristic, f, which x has. The major difference in the two is the syntactical form of the predicate. In the sentence, "S takes x to be f" the direct object of the verb, "takes" is x while in the other sentence the propositional clause, "that x being f . . .", is the object of belief.

This use of propositional clauses, T1 and T2, in the definition makes taking resemble inferring. As we have seen, Chisholm, at considerable length, attempts to avoid this inference.

Similar remarks about the synonymy of "taking" and "believing" can be made when the perceptual statements are nonpropositional. When someone perceives something and thus takes it to have a characteristic, we have said that, although he may not take it to have any particular characteristic, he does take it to have some characteristic. If we take something to have some characteristic or other, we believe that the object would not be appearing to us in some way if it did not have some characteristic and we believe that our acting in certain ways would alter the ways the object would appear which would not be the case if the object were not appearing in some way.

CHAPTER II

APPEARING, SENSING, AND TAKING

"Perceives", as we have seen, both in its propositional and nonpropositional uses is defined in terms of appearing as well as in terms of taking. In the definition of "taking" not only believing but appearing play major roles. Both T1 and T2 in the definition of "taking" refer to the way something appears to a perceiver. But the term "appears" has at least three senses in statements, two of which are employed in perceptual statements. In nonpropositional perception statements it is convenient to describe appearing in terms of sensing. In this chapter we shall examine sensing, these uses of "appears" and their implications for taking.

A. TWO USES OF "APPEAR"

Appear words like "seem", "look", "feel", and "appear" have three uses which Chisholm calls the epistemic, the comparative, and the noncomparative.¹ As the epistemic sense is the intentional rather than a perceptual sense of "appear", we shall deal at length with the comparative and

¹For a description of the uses, vid., ibid., pp. 43 - 53.

noncomparative senses.¹ In perceptual statements the comparative and noncomparative uses of "appear" occur. Let us look at each of these senses of "appear" in turn.

A locution such as, "That plum seems withered" may serve to illustrate the comparative use. If the term "seems" is used comparatively, the locution means that the plum appears in the way that withered fruit might normally be expected to appear. The plum may be expected to appear this way under the present conditions or under ordinary conditions. I may be looking at the huge orange ball at dusk

¹The epistemic sense of "appear" may be described in the following way. Let us suppose that Mamie assumes that her daughter is brushing her hair. She declares, "It appears to me that she is brushing her hair" and she may add, "At least she went to her room where she keeps her brush with the intention of brushing her hair and I heard her drop the brush on the floor and pick it up". Mamie believes or is inclined to believe that her daughter is doing what she went to her room to do. In this sense the word "appear" is being used epistemically.

If "appear" in one sense can mean that something is believed, it must occur in intentional sentences. If Smith says, "I see yellow", we may interpret him as saying that he is having a certain visual experience. If we ask Smith what he is seeing, he may reply, "I see a daffodil". In the one case he has identified the object of visual sense as a sense impression and in the other a material object. Its appearing to be a daffodil, though, does not imply that it is a daffodil; and its seeming to be a daffodil does not imply that it is not a daffodil. And something's appearing yellow does not imply that it is yellow and does not imply that it is not yellow. Also, the epistemic use of appear words may be evidence. Chisholm suggests that "evidence" may be extended: if p is evidence for q, q is evidence for something else. Someone who is looking at an aeroplane as it comes closer may observe, "It seems to be the airbus". This locution may mean "Of course, it appears to be the airbus" or "Apparently it is the airbus". In these locutions, the epistemic use of "appear" implies that the speaker has evidence for believing that what seems to be the case is the case. Cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, op. cit., and A.M. Quinton, op. cit.

on the horizon and say, "The full moon usually appears small and yellow". In this case I may be referring to the optimum--the most favourable for perceiving conditions. All of these kinds of comparative uses of "appear" have one thing in common: they can be translated into other sentences referring to things which are so-and-so. The flagpole looks to be the height of a fence post because it looks the way a flagpole would ordinarily be expected to look if it were viewed at a long distance. In the comparative sense, then, both the nature of the object and the conditions under which it is observed determine the way it appears.

It should be noted that the comparative and epistemic senses of "appear" may be expressed in the same language. The man who upon stepping outdoors into the Albertan winter and who exclaims, "The air feels cold!", may be claiming both that the air feels the way cold air might normally be expected to feel and he might be claiming that he takes it to be cold--that he believes the air is freezing. It would not appear cold if his body were not cold and if conditions like his light clothing and the wind chill were not present. And, on the other hand, he might not say, "The air feels cold!", if he did not believe that the air mass over Alberta in winter is cold.¹

¹Cf. the epistemic use of "appear" supra, p. 30, footnote 1. Usually the context in which an appear statement is made suggests the correct use of the appear word.

"Appear" can be used empirically. This third sense of "appear" can be seen in its relation to the comparative use. The statement, "The house looks square" when "looks" is used in its comparative sense, entails a statement like "The house looks the way square objects look in daylight". If, on the other hand, "looks" is intended to mean that it appears this way without any reference or comparison to anything else that appears in the same way, the word is used in the empirical or noncomparative sense. When "looks square" is taken noncomparatively, the statement, "Things which are square look square in the daylight" is synthetic. One can take a house to be square simply because it looks square when looks is used noncomparatively. In the empirical sense of appear words, then, the statement, "The house looks square", does not entail the sentence, "The house looks the way square objects look in daylight".

In empirical statements the house may be said to be square or flat-roofed only if it appears square or flat-roofed under optimum conditions. If under all conditions the house does not appear to have a flat roof, then we would not say that we see a flat-roofed house. But if the conditions are such that the top of the house appears flat, we might say that we see that the house is flat-roofed. This would be an occasion on which we know that the house is flat on top. However, if we never saw a building of any kind nor anything else that resembled the house, which was flat on

top, we would not want to say that the house is flat on top. In this case even though the house appears flat to us, we would not be prepared to claim that we know that it is flat. Suppose we know that a few of the structures which resemble the house in other ways are flat and suppose that the house appears flat-roofed to us. Again we might not feel that we know the house is flat. Even though something appears flat to someone and he knows that some things resembling it are flat, he may not know that the thing which appears flat is actually flat. And what appears flat to him which he knows resembles things that are not flat may not be known to him to be flat. Also, what does not appear flat to him may, unknown to him, be round or peaked, not flat. Even though a man does not know that anything actually is that way, he can be certain that the house now appears flat to him or that nothing now appears flat to him.

B. APPEARING AND TAKING

In order to see how the comparative and noncomparative uses of "appear" function in a taking sentence, let us consider the locution, "The policemen take the thief to be armed". If the police are thinking that the thief looks the way armed men look they are using the word "appear" in the comparative sense. They assume that if they were not seeing a man who looked like an armed man, they would not be seeing an armed thief. They also assume that, if they were to act

in certain ways, the thief would appear in ways that he would not appear if they were not seeing a thief who is armed. Because of the nature of the robbery, the police may expect that anyone who attempts to escape would come armed. It may be that under more ordinary circumstances, such as the early morning hours, the robber would be armed. Despite the fact that the police apprehend him at an unusual hour of the day for robberies, they take the man to be armed because under more normal circumstances he would be armed. Suppose the robber does not appear the way robbers usually appear and yet the authorities may assume that the robber is armed. They are now using "appear" in its noncomparative meaning. The police may think that they see a bulge in the clothing of the thief where weapons are often concealed or the actions of a thief may appear to threaten armed violence. Merely from these appearances that the man is armed, the police may assume that it is an armed man with whom they are dealing. Although they may not immediately know that the man has a weapon, the police may be quite sure that the man has every appearance of having one. They believe that if an armed robber were not appearing to them, they would not be seeing an armed robber and that certain actions on their part will cause the robber to appear differently. They assume that the robber would not appear in these different ways if they were not seeing an armed robber.

C. "APPEARS" DEFINED IN TERMS OF SENSES

Expressions using "appear" have developed in standard forms. Some of the terminology used in describing the appearances of things has given rise to many difficulties. In the propositional sentence, "S perceives that x is f", the name of the object, x, is contained in the propositional clause. We have seen that in a definition of the propositional use of "perceive" x appears in some way to S and S takes x to be f. It is with a locution like "x appears in some way to S" where x is the grammatical subject that philosophical difficulties like the sense datum fallacy arise. This locution can readily be seen to be convertible into the form "x presents some manner of appearance to S" and it is at "appearances" that philosophers, like Don Quixote, have tilted.¹

Chisholm's consideration of nonpropositional perception statements translates the locution, "x appears in some way to S", into the terminology of sensing. There are two advantages of this terminology: it avoids the sense datum fallacy and it exposes more clearly than the appearing terminology Chisholm's causal view of perception. Let us suppose that a voter in a political meeting says, "I see Trudeau". If we interpret the sentence, "I see Trudeau", to mean that the voter has an appearance or a sense datum of Trudeau, we imply that the voter is not looking at Trudeau but at an image or appearance of Trudeau in his visual sense

¹For some discussion of the sense-datum fallacy, vid. Perceiving, pp. 116 - 20, 151 - 58, Appendix, and Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, op. cit., especially pp. 85 - 288.

receptors. The sentence, "I see Trudeau", does not give rise to this difficulty when we express it in terms of sensing. The sentence can be written, "The voter senses Trudeau with respect to the man". Although these are not the terms which we ordinarily use, they are worth examining because they do not lead us to infer that the things we perceive are merely sense data or appearances. Expressing the sentence in sensing terms also brings the causal perceptual theory to the fore. The voter's sensing Trudeau with respect to the man means that the man's being Trudeau is a causal condition of the voter's sensing Trudeau and that the actions of the voter would cause variations in the way he senses which would not occur if the man were not Trudeau. Let us see then how appearing with which we have been concerned until now can be described in terms of sensing. Because sensing includes the notions of object, cause, and appearance, all notions necessary for the causal view of perception, let us consider the meaning of "senses" second.

The following example shows how appearing can be expressed in terms of sensing. "The wine tastes sweet to Laura" may be phrased "Laura senses a sweet appearance of wine". The latter locution may be easily changed into the following form, "Laura senses sweet with respect to the wine".¹ When the wine appears in some way to Laura we can

¹Cf. "Laura perceives the wine as sweet". If it is considered this way, we miss the particular meaning of "senses" which we find most useful, cf. Perceiving, pp. 121f.

say that she senses in some way with respect to the wine. The locution, "x appears . . . to S", can now be converted into the locution, "S senses . . . with respect to x".

The meaning of the locution, "S senses . . . with respect to x", involves some complicated notions. Let us first see how the concept of sensing might be elaborated by taking the example of Laura's tasting wine. When the wine tastes sweet to Laura, her taste buds have been stimulated by the wine and any change in the strength of the sugar content of the wine directly affects the way the wine tastes to Laura. If Laura drank some sherry when she had a head cold, she might find that the wine had little or no taste at all. Upon consulting a physician she would be told that her congestion is preventing her sense of taste from functioning properly. If the liquid which Laura is consuming is not wine but water coloured to resemble sherry, she would not taste the sweet taste of the wine. A chemist or physiologist might explain to her that because the substances in the liquid or the stimulations of her taste buds are not characteristic of wine, it is not wine that she is tasting. But Laura may not be at all sure that some other type of wine or red liquid which is not wine at all is before her.

Let us suppose that she is more than suspicious. Let us suppose that Laura suspects that her senses are playing tricks on her, that the liquid appears to be wine because she imagines that she is at a banquet sipping fine sherry

instead of at lunch with her family drinking tea. How might Laura ascertain whether it is sherry she is tasting merely by sipping the liquid?¹ Several steps might occur to her: she might pour water a little at a time into the liquid, she might dissolve a little spice in it, and she might sweeten it with sugar. If she made these changes in three portions of the liquid, she upon tasting each might discover that the taste of the first liquid becomes progressively weaker, the second bitter, and the last sweeter than the original beverage. Because the various tastes she experiences as she tries each portion change in a regular fashion as the various alterations are made in the strength and composition of the liquid, Laura can be assured that she is having sense impressions of a liquid rather than merely imagining or daydreaming that she is tasting sweet wine.

We have noted that the locution, "x appears . . . to S", means using the sensing terminology, that S senses . . . with respect to x.² The illustration of Laura tasting wine suggests that the tasting includes two aspects. The liquid tastes sweet because it is sherry that is stimulating her taste buds and the quality of the sweet taste depends on the strength of the sweetness in the liquid. We have previously noted that Laura upon tasting the wine might comment upon

¹Let us assume that Laura has neither the skill nor the equipment needed to test the wine scientifically.

²Ibid., p. 125.

its taste using a nonpropositional statement such as "The wine tastes sweet" or "The wine appears sweet to me". In general, when someone perceives something we may say that he perceives x or x appears in some way to him. The statement, "x appears . . . to S" means:

A1 as a consequence of x being a proper stimulus of S, S senses . . . and A2 in sensing . . ., S senses in a way that is functionally dependent upon the stimulus energy produced in S by x.¹

It is not immediately obvious from reading A1 and A2 that the notions of an object's appearing to S in some way are included. Yet both of these notions are integral parts of a causal view of taking. These key notions are contained in the terms, "proper stimulus" and "stimulus energy".² It is with these terms that we shall deal now.

"Appears" means A1

The term "proper stimulus" or "stimulus object" refers to the stimulation by an object of one of the sense organs of a perceiver. It is not sufficient to explain that a tobacco which John smells is musty because the tobacco stimulates John's olfactory receptors. If this is all we were to say, we would be admitting that a musty odour which stimulates cells in his nasal passage causes him to sniff the musty odour. We would then be saying that the odour in

¹Ibid., pp. 148f.; note that the numeration A1 and A2 is mine.

²We shall not enter into a discussion of the third important notion: functional dependence; for references to this topic, vid., ibid., p. 149.

the air appears to John to be musty. Rather than "improper" objects like atmospheric odours or light waves appearing to John, we want to describe his sensing in such a way that it is the tobacco which he smells in this way. In Chisholm's words

The proper olfactory stimuli are odiferous particles which stimulate the olfactory receptors. . . . For other types of kinesthetic sensation it is enough, I think, to say that any kinesthetic stimulus is a "proper stimulus".¹

The tobacco smells musty to John means John senses musty, as a result of tobacco's being composed of shreds having a musty odour which stimulates his olfactory receptors. Presumably, when John's olfactory receptors are receiving sugar-sweet particles they are not being stimulated by musty particles. His receptors being stimulated by sweet particles is a consequence of some objects having sweet particles. John senses sweet as a consequence of maple syrup, perhaps, being the proper stimulus. He knows that it is not tobacco which he smells because tobacco has musty ingredients not sweet ones. John would take the tobacco to be musty. By taking it to have this characteristic he assumes that the tobacco's being musty or having musty shreds is a proper stimulus of his smelling musty. John is assuming that as a consequence of the tobacco's having musty particles which stimulate his nasal passages, he sniffs a musty odour and he is assuming

¹Ibid., p. 144.

that he would not be stimulated in this way by the tobacco unless the tobacco were musty. But John may exclaim, "Nonsense, there is no tobacco hereabouts! I am smelling something musty though!" It is in order to meet this kind of remark that A2 is needed.

The office worker who listens at his office window to the sounds of the machines in the factory across the street may hear not the hum of the factory but the wind in the trees beside his cottage. As a result he hears the soft creaking and rustling. In the present terminology, he senses creaking, the trees appear to be making rustling noises. If the appearing in his reverie merely means A1, the trees which he is imagining are stimulus objects. According to A1, images, phantasies, hallucinations are proper stimuli. If we are content with A1 alone, we can say that the factory sounds that stimulate his ears as he listens at the window appear creaking and rustling. John who merely imagines a musty smell, on the grounds of A1 alone, can declare that the odours which are stimulating him appear musty. The same confusion between sense impressions and images in the mind which we encountered in our discussion of T1 and T2 is haunting us here. A little more sophisticated solution is being suggested now but the problem is the same: to distinguish between impressions of sense and ideas.

"Appears" means A2

"The impression is connected with the stimulus in a

way in which the image is not".¹ Berkeley, Hume, and Kant thought that steadiness, order, and regular series of the occurrence of sense impressions provided ample evidence for differentiating sense impressions from the objects of imagination. This regularity in the occurrence may be described by referring to variations of the stimulus energy produced in a perceiver by an object. When the intensity of a stimulus changes, it is accompanied by orderly changes in the way in which a perceiver senses. The simplest example of these concurrent variations is the work of the experimental psychologist. By bringing an ink blot closer and closer to the eyes of a subject an experimenter can produce systematic changes in the way the subject sees the ink blot; by changing cards from yellow to red to green to blue he can make the visual stimulus appear to change in regular ways; by playing a new recording now louder and now softer he can make similar trains of changes appear in his subject's auditory stimulus. In all these perceptual experiments the way in which the subject senses systematically changes with changes in the subject's proper stimulus provided the experimenter endeavours to keep constant all other conditions.

Even in everyday perceptual situations we find the same phenomenon. When we cannot read the printing in an ad in the newspaper, we turn the lamp on that portion of the

¹Ibid., p. 147.

page. When we find that some party-goers are making a great deal of noise and we ask them to close their windows, our auditory stimulus will decrease in intensity correspondingly. As we drive to work daily the buildings and intersections appear in more or less the same way each day and in the same sequence. If a crane appears alongside a building under construction or the city engineers dig a hole in the street, there will be regular changes in the way in which the proper visual stimulus will appear to us.

In contrast, systematic changes in the degree of stimulus energy does not result in these kinds of changes in our imagery. The closed doors in the hallway of an apartment building may vary in their shades as the intensity of light changes at different points in the hallway and an occupant's sense impressions as he walks to and fro from his suite will vary in the same regular way. However, from one occasion to another his thoughts may not bear any regular pattern that the proper stimuli do. He may imagine many different things which possess little or no apparent dependence upon the stimulus energy produced in him by the varying shades of the doors. The same may be said for the clinical psychologist's subject. The way the subject senses in experiments on perceptual awareness are functionally dependent upon the stimulus energy produced in the subject by the experiments. The ways in which the subject fancies are not found to be dependent upon the stimulus energy of the experimental apparatus in

the way his sensing is.¹

"Appears" means A1 and A2

The inclusion of both A1 and A2 in the definition of "appears" is useful. A man's sensing in some way we know is functionally dependent upon the stimulus energy produced in him by x. If, however, there is no fluctuation in the stimulus energy produced in him, he may still sense in some way with respect to x. When "appears" is defined merely as A2, it fails to include the experience in which the stimulation produced by a proper stimulus in a perceiver is invariant. The condition A1 which specifies that a perceiver senses merely as a consequence of an object's being a proper stimulus

¹There are occasions though upon which changes in proper stimuli may affect one's phantasies. A psychiatrist may be so familiar with the response patterns or the background of his patient that the doctor's behaviour affects the images which come to the patient. An acculturated Indian may know his people's ways and their language sufficiently well, though he has had little contact with them for years, that he successfully affects the ways in which they think of the white man's society. Chisholm points out that changes in a proper stimulus which are a function of a man's imagery as in these two cases "must have a degree of complexity which cannot be made a function merely of the degree of stimulation". Complex variables like the extensive knowledge of a patient's background which a psychiatrist has or fluency in the language of his tribal group as the acculturated Indian has are required before the psychological patterns of those with whom the Indian and the doctor are dealing can be affected. Neither the patient's images nor the Indian people's ideas are a function merely of a degree of stimulation like increasing the intensity of illumination or turning down the volume of a sound. Cf. ibid., p. 148.

is useful.¹

D. SENSING DESCRIBES "NONPERCEPTUAL"

EXPERIENCES AND MISTAKING

We are now in a position to reconstruct the simplest of the nonpropositional uses of "perceive" in terms of sensing. This will enable us to describe "nonperceptual" experiences like hallucinations and mistakes. Whenever a man perceives x and thus it appears in some way to him and he takes it to have some characteristic, we can say he senses in some way with respect to x and he takes x to have some characteristic. The experience of a textile manufacturer's touching a bolt of silk may be described in terms of his sensing in some way with respect to the silk and his taking the silk to have some characteristic.

The sensing terminology enables us to describe experiences like hallucinating, dreaming, imagining, and remembering as well as appearing. Take the ordinary experience of hearing a buzzing noise in the ears when there is no known "external" cause of the buzzing. The sentence, "Justin hears a buzzing sound in his ears" refers to this kind of experience. Justin hears a buzzing sound when there is nothing appearing to him. In the sensing terminology we can explain this mild form of hallucination by saying that, although Justin is not sensing with respect to anything at

¹The similarities in the examinations of A1 and A2 to T1 and T2 are obvious.

all, he is sensing in the way that he would sense if he were hearing something emitting a buzzing sound. There is no proper object: Justin does not sense buzzing as a consequence of their being some object's producing a buzzing which stimulates his auditory receptors.

We do sometimes say that someone who is hallucinating takes "something" to be appearing in some way. Our definition of taking, however, does not allow us to claim that something is appearing to us. T1 in the definition says that S believes that x being f is a causal condition of the way it appears to S. It does not say that x being f is a cause of the way it appears with respect to x. We are not obliged to say that when we take something in some way, something appears in some way to us.

We can deal with experiences like hallucinations in another way in order to avoid implying that a "physical" object is being perceived. Suppose that a sailor who says, "I see that rain clouds are gathering overhead", is hallucinating. We usually say that he takes "something" to be clouds implying that there is actually "something" there. We may describe his taking "something" to be clouds in terms of his believing that he would not be sensing clouds if what he sees are not clouds. The statement, "His believing that he would not be sensing clouds with respect to what he sees unless clouds are what he sees", is intentional--it does not imply that it is true that clouds are what he sees.

The sensing terminology also allows us to handle mistaken perception. If a hunter mistakes a tree stump for a bear, he does not see a bear nor does he see an appearance of a bear. Using the sensing terminology we are able to explain this mistake in the following way: what the hunter sees is a stump which he erroneously takes to be a bear. His seeing a bear means that with respect to the stump he senses a bear, and he wrongly takes the stump to be a bear. He senses a bear with respect to a stump and he wrongly assumes that he would not be sensing a bear with respect to the stump if it were not a bear. Moreover, he erroneously assumes that if he were to act in certain ways, he would sense in ways he would not sense if he were not now sensing a bear.

E. SENSING AND TAKING

Finally, we shall consider whether perceiving expressed in terms of sensing implies taking. Someone who perceives an object may not take it to be the object which he senses in some way. In the nonpropositional sense of "perceives" this would amount to an observer's sensing in some way with respect to something but this is not assuming that what he senses with respect to the object is what he perceives.

This phenomenon has an analogy in the relation between language and perception.¹ When a friend tells us

¹Cf., ibid., pp. 160f.

about his holidays, we may later recall that he went to the mountains without being able to recall the words or even any of the expressions he used to describe his vacation. Jennie may remark that she saw her grandmother but be unable to describe her hairstyle or her dress--she saw her relative but she cannot say how she sensed with respect to her grandmother. When people are asked what they heard, they usually do not begin by telling the way they sensed with respect to the sounds. They begin by telling us that they heard a scream, folk-rock music, and so on. There is a distinction to be noted here. To say that someone does not notice the way he senses with respect to something is not to say that he assumes that with respect to it he senses in that way. Even though he senses in this way, it is false to claim that he accepts the proposition that he senses in that way.

CHAPTER III

EVIDENCE AND TWO CRITERIA

A. THE JUSTIFICATION OF PERCEPTUAL STATEMENTS

An attempt to find evidence for a perceptual statement which we make should be derived from the usual way in which we cite evidence for what we see, hear, touch, and smell. Although we are not often asked to defend our observations, it may be instructive to examine what would be brought forward as a defence if we were asked. When we do justify a statement we appeal to the available evidence and to any new evidence which arises. But in justifying a statement we are not primarily interested in new evidence--we are not setting out to test or confirm it. What we want to do most of all is to weigh the readily available evidence and any new evidence which might have occurred. We wish to know if the statement itself is new evidence.

Let us embark on a programme of what we consider to be a common pattern of justification of statements. Many statements which we try to defend bring us to make claims about what we perceive. Sometimes these perceptual claims may be challenged. This may come about in the following way: Someone says: "I see Gene's house through the trees" and a companion asks, "Oh, I cannot make it out. Are you sure? What makes you say that?". Now the friend may be

asking a question like "What reason do you have for taking that to be Gene's house?". The question may be put in other ways: "Why do you say that you see Gene's house?" and "What makes you think or believe that what you see is Gene's house?". The answer to the first question--what makes the observer utter the sentence about seeing Gene's house--may be expressed in terms of what the perceiver thinks he sees or what he takes something he sees to be.¹ However the question is put, the observer's claim to see something is being challenged. Answers to the questioning might take several lines all of which would be attempts to justify the claim to see Gene's house.

What might be a common pattern of justification of the statement, "I see Gene's house through the trees"? An answer to the initial demand to give a reason for the statement might be,

J1 I can see that the house has a bay window by the front door. There is no other house around here with a window like that.

What is now claimed is, not that the house is Gene's, but that there is a big bay window by the front door and no other house near here has that description. It is noteworthy that the information that no other house answers to

¹The perceiver's observation itself is not being doubted. When we see something, we have all the evidence we need for a statement that we are seeing something. With these questions the companion is wondering why the observer thinks that what he sees is Gene's house. He is not asking the question, "Why are you seeing Gene's house?".

this description near here was apparently acquired at some time prior to the present perception.

If the perceiver is willing to be questioned further about his perceptual claim rather than about his knowledge of the neighbourhood, the query, "What makes you think you see a bay window by the front door?" might be made. A reply might run like this:

J2 I see that it is rectangular and has a yellow frame. I remember that there is such a window in Gene's house.

Finally, if the observer is sufficiently tolerant, he might answer a question such as "What makes you claim the window frame is yellow?" by saying

J3 It looks yellow. It is some distance away. If something that far away in this light looks yellow, it probably is yellow.¹

In J2 the observer has referred to what he sees and what he recalls about Gene's house. In J3, however, he is describing what is appearing to him (It looks yellow) and he is comparing the way the house appears to the way certain characteristics of things appear.²

At this juncture there might be some allusions made to hallucination and to further information not derived directly from the observation of the house. After considering some of these possibilities, a perceiver who is a

¹Ibid., pp. 56f.

²This is the comparative use of "appear" or "looks".

philosopher might try to answer the question about the colour of the window frame by saying,

J4 "There is something that appears yellow to me.

and J5 I am being appeared to in a way which is yellow.¹

When we look at these replies, we notice a progression. Statements J1 and J2 make perceptual claims about a window by the door, its shape and the colour of its frame, as well as making non-perceptual claims about other houses in the district and about what is remembered. When the request is made to justify thinking that the window is yellow, appeal is made to the way the window appears to the observer. With these appear statements the attempt to justify the original perceptual statement ends.

B. THE EMPIRICAL CRITERION OF EVIDENCE

Appear statements in which characteristics like colour, texture, heat, or cold, and sound only form the predicates are thought to form the foundation of our statements of knowledge. These primitive statements are not supported by nonperceptual information nor any other kind of information. It seems that in trying to defend epistemic statements we sometimes appeal to perceptual statements; in defending perceptual statements we arrive at primitive ways of appearing.

¹Ibid., pp. 81f.

Ways of appearing are evidence-making characteristics. They constitute a criterion of evidence. The empirical criterion of evidence reads:

E1 A statement describing noncomparatively the ways in which we are appeared to is a statement for which we have adequate evidence.¹

Statements of this kind make the claim that we are appeared to in a certain way. Although there are no hypotheses or propositions which statements about appearing entail, we can by the logic of probability supply the conditions under which these statements may be applied to other propositions and hypotheses. Provided a subject does not have adequate evidence for any hypotheses in relation to which these statements are improbable, he has adequate evidence for these hypotheses as well as the statements about appearing.² If a subject has adequate evidence for a statement, then either the statement uses "appear" noncomparatively or the statement is probable in relation to such noncomparative appear statements. We may conclude that an observer has adequate evidence for the statement, "I see Gene's house through the trees", if it is more probable than not in relation to statements

¹Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 67f., and 84; note that E1 omits the word "belief". It is correct to omit the word "belief" because a statement containing the word "appear" used noncomparatively in itself is a statement for which we have adequate evidence. When we are thus appeared to, although we take an object to be appearing to us in some way, it is merely its appearing to us which provides us with evidence. In the empirical view of evidence a man who is thus appeared to and who does not believe that he is appeared to this way, nevertheless has adequate evidence.

²Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 5f., 68 - 75; note that I shall not discuss theories of induction or probability.

describing, noncomparatively, the ways in which he is being appeared to.

Let us treat the pattern of justification, J1 to J5, as a simple attempt to confirm the observation, "I see Gene's house through the trees". We know that the attempt to confirm the observation will have failed if there are any statements included which use any descriptive terms other than noncomparative appear terms. When we look at the statements justifying the observation, we shall find several which contain information not composed merely of appear words. Let us, like Chisholm, call this "nonperceptual" data, "independent information".

Let us examine now the five statements, J1 to J5. The final two statements, J4 and J5, referring merely to the observer's being appeared to yellow are statements describing noncomparatively the way he is appeared to. If J1 to J5 is looked upon as a paradigm of the confirmation of the original observation, according to the empirical criterion of evidence J4 and J5 are evidence of the original observation. Let us take the other three statements in the order they occurred. Besides describing the bay window by the door, statement J1 mentions that there is not another house satisfying this description in the neighbourhood. This data about the neighbourhood dwellings which was accumulated before the present perception is independent information. The next answer, J2, besides describing the shape and colour of

the window, gives information drawn from the memory of the perceiver which again is independent information. Finally, the claim J3 is made which does not tell us anything about what the perceiver actually sees. It is obvious that claims about seeing that a certain state of affairs exists have turned into statements about what is appearing and what is known and remembered about experiences other than this one. It would not be an exaggeration to say that most of the defence of the original perceptual statement derives its support from independent information and only some of its support from appear statements. As far as this simple confirmation programme is concerned, the appear statements, J4 and J5, will not support any of the previous claims, J1 to J3, unless they are accompanied by appeals to independent information.

The claim that the observation, "I see Gene's house through the trees", is justified by appealing to appear statements and the probability that these statements are true, depends to a considerable degree on independent information. We may conclude that the attempt to confirm the observation has failed. The fact that the inductive argument includes much more than statements using the term "appear", noncomparatively, may be the reason for the failure. This is Chisholm's view:

No one has ever constructed a good inductive argument whose premises contain only appear statements . . . and whose conclusion ascribes, to some "external"

physical thing, any characteristic other than that of appearing in some way.¹

In justifying a perceptual statement the conditions--physical, physiological and psychological--upon which the statement is made are implied. Apparently more statements than appear statements are needed in order to provide adequate support for perceptual statements. The empirical criterion of evidence, then, although it may be useful when applied to some experiences, does not allow us to admit as evident all the statements for which we want to claim that we have adequate evidence.

C. THE TAKING CRITERION OF EVIDENCE

We are looking for a criterion of evidence which will supply us with adequate evidence for a perceptual claim like "I see Gene's house". Let us suppose that whenever we describe what we take to be the case we thereby have evidence for what we claim to perceive.² Takings are now evidence-making: they provide us with a criterion of evidence which we can express in the following way:

E2 A statement in which we take something to have a characteristic or some characteristic is a statement for which we have adequate evidence.³

¹Ibid., p. 74; for some of Chisholm's other criticisms of the empirical criterion of evidence vid., "The Problem of Empiricism", and "Appear", "Take" and "Evident" in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, op. cit., pp. 347 - 54, 473 - 85.

²Perceiving, pp. 75 -80.

³An alternative formulation is "A statement of the form, 'S takes x to be f' or 'S takes x to have some characteristic' is a statement for which we have adequate evidence.

For convenience, let us consider a situation similar to the one which gave rise to a pattern of justification, J1 to J5, of the observation, "I see Gene's house".

Our contention will be that all the statements cited as justification for the observation might be made in terms of taking. The answer to the first question might be "I take the house to have a bay window". If a man defends his observation that it is Gene's house that he sees by pointing to his belief that it has a certain window next to the front door, according to criterion E2 he has every right to claim to be giving us evidence. And if in reply to a further request to give a reason for saying that there is a bay window, instead of replying in the form of J2, he declares, "I take the window frame to be yellow". I remember that Gene's house has such a window", he has supported his claim to see the window. In answering a further question about the window's colour he might say that he takes the window to look the way windows look in this light and at this distance. If he does believe this, he has sufficient evidence for stating truly that the window looks, say, yellow. The replies which are similar to J1, J2 and J3 can all easily be couched in taking terms. Even J4 and J5 could be expressed this way: "I take something to be yellow" and "I take the way I am appeared to be yellow". If we allow a taking statement to be one for which we have adequate evidence any one of the five replies is evidence. We can say that the belief that Gene's

house is a causal condition of its appearing as Gene's is all the evidence needed to say truly, "Gene's house is seen".

There are difficulties in accepting statements like these as evidence. In fact the building the observer claims to be seeing may not be a house--it may be a barn. It may be a formation of the bushes and trees in the woods which resembles a house but is not a house. Even if the observer is correct in his claim that it is a house which he sees, it may be Ruth's house or a stranger's house and not Gene's house at all. If any statement having "take" as its verb is in itself evidence, then a soldier's taking a certain civilian to be an enemy is evidence enough for his saying that this is an enemy civilian. For the soldier will believe that the civilian would not appear to him in the way he does if the civilian were not an enemy. Since the civilian is appearing as the enemy and he takes him to be hostile, his evidence for claiming that the civilian is in fact one of the enemy is adequate. A prejudice, emotional aversion, or mistaken judgment could be prompting the soldier to make this assumption. Consequently, a prejudice or hunch would lay claim on these grounds to be adequate evidence. At the very least we require a corrective such as an argument whose premises are noncomparative appear statements in order to reach a more suitable criterion. If we do accept this kind of corrective, we fall victim to the same attacks that those who accept only the empirical criterion do.

It is imperative to avoid the excesses of the taking criterion. In particular, we do not want to admit as evidence for the observation, "I see Gene's house", a statement like "I assume that the house has a big bay window by the front door". Taking as a criterion is much too broad--its scope exposes us to some implausible conclusions. As a criterion of evidence E2 must be rejected.

D. THE SENSIBLE TAKING CRITERION

An adequate criterion will have the advantages of the appear statements of the empirical criterion as well as the liberalizing effects of the taking criterion. In the pattern of justification of the statement, "I see Gene's house through the trees", using "take", the second reply bears close scrutiny if we are to describe a more adequate criterion than either the empirical or the taking. It seems to bear similarities both to the noncomparative appear statements forming the empirical criterion and to taking sentences.

The second reply is "I take the window to be rectangular and yellow". Does this type of statement provide us with adequate evidence for the perceptual statement? It says merely that the perceiver takes something to be rectangular and yellow. Chisholm's view is that this statement supplies us with adequate evidence "even if the statement is false and even if nothing whatever is appearing to the observer".¹

¹Ibid., p. 82.

He believes that this sentence exhibits a certain class of takings which constitute a criterion of evidence which is adequate. These takings all exhibit the form, "S takes x to have a certain characteristic or a certain relation". The class of characteristics and relations is referred to by Price; they are coextensive with the Aristotelians' "proper objects of sense" and the "common sensibles", and with Reid's objects of "original perception".¹

The characteristics include: being blue, red, green or yellow; being hard, soft, rough, smooth, heavy, light, hot, or cold; and that of sounding, or making-a-noise. The relations include: being the same, or different with respect to any of the characteristics in question; being more like one object than another with respect to any of the characteristics, or with respect to hue, saturation, and brightness, or with respect to loudness, pitch and timbre. The class of characteristics and relations also includes the "common sensibles"--that is, "movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude"--as well as what is intended by such terms as "above", "below", "right", "near", "far", "before", "after", "simultaneous", and "at last" or "to endure".²

In taking something to have any one of these characteristics, called sensible characteristics, we have adequate evidence for the proposition that there is something with this characteristic. If in our definition of the statement, "S takes x to be f", the letter f stands for one of the sensible characteristics or relations listed, we have in the statement a criterion of evidence. When S assumes that a window's

¹Ibid., pp. 83f.

²Ibid., p. 83; note that olfactory and gustatory characteristics are not included.

being rectangular is a causal condition of his being appeared to rectangular, he is entitled to claim that he has evidence for his thinking that he sees a rectangular window. In non-propositional perception statements, taking x to have some characteristic or relation, is evidence for the statement, "S perceives x".

This criterion which Chisholm names the sensible taking criterion can now take its place along with the empirical criterion of evidence. It reads:

E3 whenever we take something to have, or not to have, a certain sensible characteristic, or whenever we take a group of things to stand, or not to stand, in a certain sensible relation, we then have adequate¹ evidence for the propositions we thus take to be true.

We may consider E3 a qualified taking criterion for it specifies that for our beliefs to be evidence for a statement they must be beliefs that things have sensible characteristics or sensible relations and not merely that things have characteristics. The sensible characteristics referred to in E3 are expressed by appear words which are intended in their noncomparative or comparative sense. That is, a statement such as "I believe that the squeak sounds more

¹Ibid., p. 84; note that Chisholm adds two criteria referring to something's appearing in different or similar ways to different sense organs and referring to similarities and differences among ways of appearing. The latter criterion can accommodate gustatory and olfactory characteristics where their similarities and differences are concerned. Since I do not believe these additional criteria alter my consideration of sensible taking and evidence, I am not discussing them here.

like a mouse's than a kitten's" is acceptable evidence for the statement, "I take the squeak to be that of a mouse", provided the word, "squeak", is used in its noncomparative or comparative sense.

Chisholm considers two major criticisms which have been made to his advocacy of sensible taking as a criterion of evidence.¹ The first criticism centres about the role of memory in finding support for thinking that what one sees is true. In the pattern of justification of the statement, "I see Gene's house", the reply J1 referred to the observer's recalling that there were no houses with a bay window in the neighbourhood except Gene's. It is obvious that the observer's memory may be failing him or that he might be recalling something quite different. There may be another house nearby with a bay window, for example, but he at the time of his reply does not remember it. He may even already have adopted the false belief that Gene's house has a bay window. In these cases his assuming that there is no other house hereabouts with a bay window depends on a false or mistaken memory. Takings may be false for many other reasons. A thirsty man, for instance, may take the word "weather" to be "water"; a wishful student may assume that he has successfully passed an exam; a Black Muslim may be sufficiently prejudiced to take all white men to be his enemies. Takings

¹Ibid., pp. 86 - 94.

are also affected by emotions, attitudes, wishes, hallucinations, delusions and defects of the sense organs and the brain. "Every instance of taking is not objective (caused by the object), but is a result both of the external stimulation and of the psychological and physiological state of the perceiver."¹ However, sensible taking is a condition of evidence according to this view even though it is the result of a false belief or a mistaken memory. When someone takes a red door to be orange, he has adequate evidence for the proposition that what he is seeing is orange. But another version of the criticism in terms of remembering takes the position that remembering itself is a criterion of evidence. For a man to be mistaken about what he does remember is surely impossible. He can, however, be mistaken about what he thinks he remembers. A complete theory of evidence would have to deal with remembering and thinking that one remembers.²

The second criticism asserts that the only source of evidence is good takings. Good takings are those which do not result from mistakes, illusions or organic defects. If we take the car on our right not to be turning left at the intersection and we are not mistaken or deluded and all our organs are functioning properly, we have evidence adequate to claim that the car is not going to turn left. Chisholm disallows this criticism on the grounds that the state we are

¹Ibid., p. 87.

²See Chisholm's remarks, ibid., pp. 90 - 94.

in when we make this claim does not exhibit one of the marks of evidence. A statement is raised to the status of a criterion of evidence when the state of the author of the statement exhibits certain marks of evidence. Before we can see how to deal with the second criticism or how to evaluate the empirical and sensible taking criteria of evidence, it is necessary to describe what a statement must be like for it to be included in the class of evidence.¹

E. FINDING THE ADEQUACY OF CRITERIA

Perhaps the perceptual responses human beings make to things give us a clue to what we can assume is evidence.²

¹For a brief discussion of good takings, vid. infra, p. 72, footnote 1.

²In Chisholm's view there are only two ways in which we can begin to find those experiences which we can call marks of evidence. We can accept the doctrine of synthetic a priori statements or we can believe that certain propositions are in themselves evidence. The first way he tries to avoid. By moving in the latter direction a course is successfully steered through the shoals of the synthetic a priori. In effect some human states turn out to be marks of evidence simply because we believe they are. The hope, animal faith, or postulate is that certain beliefs will be marks of evidence. Belief exhibits closer similarities to emotions and feelings than it does to generalizations in science and mathematics. Statements expressing our beliefs are similar to emotive sentences and dissimilar from scientific generalizations in at least one respect: They are neither true nor false. Since they are not synthetic the synthetic a priori is avoided. Chisholm calls these sentences containing convictions and feelings statements of approval and disapproval. Interpretations of statements of approval might be "emotive" or "performative". A statement of conviction like "Oliver assumes the fruit tree is pink" would mean that Oliver approves of the notion that he would not be appeared to pink if the tree were not pink; the statement may be interpreted as Oliver's giving vent to his feelings that if he acted in certain ways, regular variations in the way the tree appears would occur. Ibid., pp. 104f. and 108f.

If there is some way to corroborate the relation between perceptual experience and evidence, there is reason to claim that our experience is true. Let us see how this attempt to work out a theory of evidence might be elaborated.

Perceptual Experience as Evidence

In order to find out what might serve as a mark of the adequacy of statements thought to provide evidence, Chisholm looks at those properties which are common to all perceptual experiences. In the nonpropositional and the propositional senses of the word "perceive", it is obvious that perception includes two variables--an object, physical or nonphysical and the sense experience of a perceiver.¹ One way to talk about a relationship between a subject and the things he perceives is to describe the powers or dispositions of the things to evoke sense impressions in us. We speak of a dull highway and a beautiful sky. Adjectives like "dull" and "beautiful" may designate the properties of things as well as the feelings of individuals. A piece of music may be described by saying that it expresses a melancholy mood. Given sufficient knowledge of "psychophysics" Chisholm speculates that we could confirm statements like "If under . . . conditions the music stimulates an artist who is . . . the music will have a melancholy tone for him."²

¹Cf. A.M. Quinton, op. cit., p. 497.

²Perceiving, p. 138.

Things evoke predicates for things have characteristics or powers. A perceptual theory spells out the relation between things "out there" and "ways of appearing".

We have noted that things have the power to evoke certain responses in us. But many things evoke a variety of responses. A black man may arouse hate in one perceiver, pride in another, and pity in a third. Are there some experiences occurring to human beings which, more often than not, are identical experiences? In Chisholm's thought it is only these kinds of experiences which are candidates for marks of evidential statements. If it could be established that some ways of appearing, for example, produce certain states of mind in human beings, we would count statements composed of these ways of appearing and these states as marks for what could be considered evidence.

There is one kind of experience which invariably provides us with a mark for what we shall judge to be good evidence. This is recognizable by the kind of state we are in when we are believing something to be appearing to us in a certain way or, at least, in some way.

F. DEVELOPING MARKS OF ADEQUATE EVIDENCE

Chisholm hopes that certain human states provide marks of evidence. He also hopes that these marks will be marks of truth:

We hope that, if there is some general mark of evidence, a certain type of state M which is a mark of evidence

for a certain type of hypothesis H, then M will be a reliable criterion of truth; we hope that, more often than not, when we believe H while we are in state M, we will believe truly.¹

Like Peirce he is convinced that human beings have a tendency to make correct guesses. These guesses are contained in hypothetical statements of perception. This view, then, of perception rests on the faith that the human mind is "strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world".² We have only to find premises with which to begin building our perceptual edifice. Once we have them we may inductively confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that a certain mark of evidence is also a mark of truth. When Oliver believes that the fruit tree is pink while he is in the state M, we may inductively confirm or disconfirm that with a fair degree of probability Oliver believes that the tree is pink truly. We also have the faith that any false belief about what is to be considered as evidence will not long survive. By a process of inductively confirming our original propositions, we can be assured that our marks of evidence have a "natural connection" with marks of truth. We at least can take encouragement from the fact that more of our tests support our original propositions than call them in question. The appeal is to that experience a perceiver has when he is in state M. As long as this physiological state is fulfilled, perceptual experience is

¹Ibid., p. 38.

²C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 6-417; see also, ibid., 5.50, 5.384; 5.591-592 referred to in Perceiving, pp. 38 and 39.

evidence-making; continuous recurrence of this state assures us that this mark of evidence is good, for it leads us to form true beliefs.

As yet we do not know what kind of proposition, which we believe while in state M, hypothesis H could be. Certain propositions are of such a kind that when we believe them while we are in the state M, the state will be a reliable criterion of truth. We also acknowledge that these propositions will be those which, prior to our philosophical inquiry, we believed to be true. These propositions we believe refer to sense experience. In particular, they include the sensible characteristics and relations.

A mark of evidence is a state of the subject. When we believe a proposition while in this state, we take the proposition to be true.¹ Suppose a collection of green and brown colours and a rectangular shape appears to Josie. Josie may say that she sees a house provided that "the proposition which is thus taken to be true is a true proposition for which the perceiver has adequate evidence".² Josie takes the house to be brown, green, and rectangular. This means that she believes that she would not be appeared to in this way unless a house were there and she assumes that if she acted in certain ways that she would be appeared to in correspondingly different ways. Since "appear" is being used

¹Ibid., p. 90

²ibid.

in the noncomparative sense and the characteristics of the house are all sensible, she has adequate evidence for the hypothesis, "The house is brown, green, and rectangular". Because her experience of the house confirms this belief that the house has this description, Josie believes that the hypothesis is true.

A Circular Argument

The argument developed in support of this sketch of Chisholm's theory of evidence states that someone has adequate evidence for those perceptual statements which he makes while he is in a state which exhibits the appropriate marks of evidence. The argument also states that if the author of one of these perceptual statements while in state M believes a certain type of hypothesis H, the hypothesis that a certain mark of evidence is also a mark of truth may be inductively confirmed or disconfirmed.

With the qualifications mentioned by the above discussion the argument has the following form:

- (1) Certain perceptual statements are evidence.
- (2) Evidential statements are true.
- (3) Certain perceptual statements are true.

Premise (1) of the argument is a belief that we have. We feel that certain statements of perception are evidence. Premise (2) is confirmed by our experience. In the course of human experience those statements of evidence which we believe to be true but which are not true will be weeded

out, or so we believe.

We can only know that premise (2) is true by means of induction. Provided we have a set of statements that we know to be evident we can inductively confirm (2). Premise (1) says that a certain set of statements is evidence. How can we know that a certain set of statements is evidence? We can know which statements are evident if we know what good evidence is. But we do not know this except through inductively confirming premise (2). We must know, then, which statements are evident because we know that the subject of premise (1) is either evidence or true. If the subject of premise (1) is evidence, the premise is a tautology. Then we must know that the subject, certain perceptual statements, is true. Since this is the conclusion which we wish to reach, the argument is circular.¹

The arguments establishing the empirical and sensible taking criteria of evidence illustrate this circular reasoning. The second premise in each case will be the same as (2): "Evidential statements are true". In the argument in support of the empirical criterion the first premise will be "Statements describing noncomparatively the ways in which we are appeared to are evidence" and the conclusion will be "the noncomparative appear statements are true". In order for the second premise to be true it must be inductively confirmed

¹Cf., ibid., pp. 38f., 101ff., 112.

by a set of statements which we know to be evidence. The truth of premise (2) rests on induction using noncomparative appear statements which we know to be evidence. To avoid making the first premise a tautology we have to know that statements which describe noncomparatively the ways in which we are appeared to are true. As this is the conclusion of this argument, the argument is circular.

In examining the argument establishing the sensible taking criterion let us for convenience use the following abbreviated form of the first premise: "Taking something to have or not to have a certain sensible characteristic is evidence". Premise (2) will be the same--Evidential statements are true--and the conclusion will be "Taking something to have or not to have a certain sensible characteristic is true". Taking statements of this kind which we know to be evidence are needed in order to inductively confirm premise (2). The only way in which the first premise can be true and not be tautological is for the subject, the sensible taking, to be true.¹ But since this is what we want the conclusion to be, the argument establishing the sensible taking criterion also is circular.

Although Chisholm admits that he is reasoning in a circle, he takes comfort in the knowledge "that induction does not discredit the marks of evidence of its premises".²

¹Cf., ibid., p. 89.

²Ibid., p. 38.

Despite this serious flaw in his theory of evidence he suggests that to have adequate evidence for some proposition one is in a state which constitutes a mark of evidence for that proposition.

G. THE ADEQUACY OF THE CRITERIA

Chisholm established three marks of evidence. For a subject to have adequate evidence he must be in a state which exhibits the three marks of evidence. The marks of evidence would be some state or condition of a subject, S, such that

- M1 The state of S could be described without using "know", "perceive", "evident", or any other epistemic term.
- M2 S could not believe falsely at any time either that he is in that state at that time or that he is not in that state at that time.¹
- M3 Whenever S is in the state, S has adequate evidence for the proposition.²

¹It was suggested in the criticism of the sensible taking criterion that good takings supply us with adequate evidence. These takings would violate M2. S could believe falsely that his taking is a good taking--that his taking is not the result of an organic defect.

²Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 34f; M3 is difficult to understand. Chisholm criticizes Descartes' mark of evidence--any proposition is evidence if it is one which "we conceive very clearly and distinctly"--by pointing out that many statements which we conceive clearly and distinctly are false. *Ibid.*, p. 36. Chisholm is implying that a statement for which we have adequate evidence must be true. In his theory of evidence Chisholm does admit that what is evident is true but that it is not what M3 states. Another possible interpretation of M3 would be psychological. When S claims that he has adequate evidence for a proposition, the physiological and psychological states of S are such that they could be

These are the marks by means of which we are able to judge whether the perceptual statements a subject makes while he is in a state which exhibits these marks are adequate evidence. Now it is necessary to see whether a subject's state when he cites statements of the form of E1 and E3 as evidence exhibits the three marks.¹

A prima facie case can be made for the state of a subject, when he cites the empirical criterion as evidence, possessing the first mark of evidence, M1. A statement which describes noncomparatively the ways in which we are appeared to does not obviously include any epistemic terms. The statement, "The ball appears oblong to the batter", means that the batter senses in some way and the way he senses is functionally dependent upon the stimulus energy produced in him by the ball. This certainly could be the noncomparative use of "appear". And "appears", unlike "perceives", is not epistemic. It is true, then, to say that the state of the author of E1 has the first mark of evidence.²

said to be the conditions of adequate evidence. In this view certain states of S are such that they in themselves are all the evidence needed.

¹Since the taking criterion E2 has already been found to be inadequate, it will not be considered in the light of the three marks.

²Note that Chisholm's formulation of the empirical criterion includes the term, "belief", whereas E1 does not. He says that we have adequate evidence for "any belief, expressible in a noncomparative statement describing the ways in which we are appeared to . . .". Ibid., p. 84. If we admit the term "belief" into the statement of E1, we must

The empirical criterion of evidence does have the second mark of evidence, M2. If someone is in a state such that he is being appeared to in a certain way, he is being appeared to. He may or may not assert that he is being appeared to in some way but if he were asked he would certainly say that he is being appeared to. If the dog is now appearing brown to a man, and the man has no additional evidence for the proposition that he is being appeared to brown, he has adequate evidence that the dog is brown. It could not be false that he is being appeared to brown at the same time that the dog appears brown to him.¹ Statements in which the appear words are used noncomparatively cannot be false. When a kettle appears boiling to a man where the term, "boiling", is used noncomparatively, the man cannot be mistaken that he is being appeared to boiling.

Finally, is the third mark of evidence borne out in E1? Let us accept the interpretation of M3 that the psychological and physiological states of S are such that they are

ask whether a subject's state when he believes E1 has the first mark of evidence. There is considerable suggestion by Chisholm that "belief" is an epistemic term: the undefined locution, "h is more worthy of S's belief than i", is regarded as epistemic, *ibid.*, p. 4; "belief" is referred to as an epistemic conviction, *ibid.*, pp. 104ff.; "believes" means accepts and "acceptable" is an epistemic term, *ibid.*, p. 8; cf. *ibid.*, p. 78. If, as I believe, there is good reason for saying that Chisholm's formulation of the empirical criterion contains an epistemic term, it is false to conclude that the state of someone who believes E1 exhibits M1.

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 16f. and 65f.

conditions for adequate evidence.¹ If you hear an explosion, you have evidence that the sound you hear is loud.²

What appears to us where "appear" is taken noncomparatively is all the evidence we need. When S is in the physiological state of perceiving something, he has adequate evidence that he is perceiving something. That is, his state is such that it satisfies M3.

It remains to determine whether the state of a subject when he cites sensible taking as evidence exhibits the three marks of evidence. When we take something to have a sensible characteristic or to stand in a sensible relation, we employ the word, "take". But "take" is defined in terms of believe and there is good reason to assume that "believe" is an epistemic term.³ We may conclude that the state of the subject when he assumes E3 to be adequate evidence does not have the first mark of evidence. The state of a subject who cites E3 as evidence does have the second mark of evidence. To take a boat to be long is to believe certain things about the way the boat appears and will appear as conditions change. Finally, when the sailor takes the boat to be long,

¹For a discussion of this interpretation, vid., supra, p. 63, footnote 2.

²Cf. ibid., p. 55.

³For some good reasons for viewing "believe" as epistemic vid. supra, pp. 18 - 28 especially pp. 26 - 28.

an instance of E3, his state is such that he has adequate evidence. The state of someone who cites E3 as evidence exhibits the third mark of evidence.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is useful to view perceiving and taking as they occur in the two types--propositional and nonpropositional--of perceptual statements. In the nonpropositional sense of "perceive" it is not clear whether the thing perceived is the thing that the perceiver knows he is perceiving. A traveller who sees a grain elevator on the horizon may not know that what he sees is a grain elevator--he may think he sees a tree. From the nonpropositional form of a perceptual statement no inference can be made as to the object perceived but not as to its characteristic. In contrast, from a propositional statement like "He sees that Citation is the winner" we can infer both that the horse he sees is Citation and that the horse is the winner of the race. In propositional perception statements the subject knows both what he perceives and its characteristic while in nonpropositional perception statements the subject may not know either the object he perceives or its characteristic.

This relationship between perceiving and the object of perceiving can be expressed in terms of taking. If a diver sees that the water is deep, he both takes what he is looking at to be water and he takes the depth of the water to be considerable. The propositional use of "sees" entails taking. If the diver merely sees the water, although we do not wish

to say that he does not take the water to have any characteristic, we do want to claim that the diver takes the water to have some characteristic. "Sees" like other perceptual words when used nonpropositionally implies taking.

Taking is defined in terms of believing and appearing as well as causality. Although the definition of "taking" uses the expression, "believes that", taking is not an instance of inference. And though the description of "appearing" refers to physical and physiological laws, "taking" does not mean believing these or any other laws. Rather when we hear that Kennedy is dead and thus take him to be dead, we would be surprised to find that what we believe--that he would not appear this way unless he were dead--is false. But whether we do or do not take him to be dead, we do not imply that the sentence, "Kennedy is dead", is true. Taking is irreducibly intentional.

"Taking" can be defined as believing that if one acts in certain ways, one would sense in ways he would not sense if he were not perceiving something. This ensures that a perceiver will distinguish sense impressions from images and ideas. However, there is an important condition on this definition. If a man sees that a cow is brown, and thus takes it to be brown, there must be only small variations in the brown way the cow appears to him. But a man who sees that the cow is brown and so assumes that his acting will result in changes in the cow's appearing to him would assume

this only if he assumed something else. He would also assume that he would not be appeared to brown unless the cow were brown. We conclude that for a perceiver to take the cow to be brown, he would both have to assume that the cow would not be appearing brown unless it were a brown cow and that by acting in certain ways he could produce systematic changes in the way the cow appears to him.

The terms, "taking" and "sensing" or "appearing" permit us to describe hallucinatory, dream, and imaginative experiences as well as mistaken perception. Someone who imagines that he sees centaurs may explain that centaurs exist because he would not be sensing centaurs with respect to the object of his vision if there were not centaurs. He could be told that he is merely imagining centaurs for his assuming that the statement, "Centaurs exist", is true may not be true. Mistaking the word "blip" for the word "slip" may be explained by saying that the reader sees the word "blip" which he wrongly takes to be "slip".

The distinction between perceiving something and accepting that something is perceived already mentioned in these remarks is a clue to Chisholm's theory of evidence. The contention is that a statement such as "Her hair appeared curly" does not imply that we accept or believe the statement. This seems to be supported by the ordinary use of the terms "not notice". In the situation where the speaker is appeared to curly but does not notice that he is

appeared to this way, we may say that he does not believe that he is being appeared to curly.

There are two general remarks we can make in regard to evidence. The first is that in his theory of evidence Chisholm evolves a circular argument. In order for perceptual statements to be evidence we must assume before beginning the argument that they are true. Since this is what the argument is to prove, it is circular. This weakness in the foundations of the theory discredits all attempts to prove that the empirical and sensible taking criteria are adequate evidence.

The second remark concerns the evaluation of the adequacy of two criteria of evidence. The first criterion, the empirical criterion of evidence, is

E1 A statement describing noncomparatively the ways we are appeared to is a statement for which we have adequate evidence.

Sensible taking is the other criterion of evidence:

E3 Whenever we take something to have, or not to have, a certain sensible characteristic, or whenever we take a group of things to stand, or not to stand, in a certain sensible relation, we then have adequate evidence for the propositions we thus take to be true.

The adequacy of the empirical and sensible taking criteria judged in the light of the marks of evidence (M1, M2, M3) is presented in the following scheme:

	<u>Adequate</u>	<u>Inadequate</u>
M1	E1	E3
M2	E1 and E3	---
M3	E1 and E3	---

A better case might be made by making two changes. The mark, M2, could be changed to read in part, "S could not be appeared to falsely at any time either . . .". Another change might be to let E1 be a belief. If the first is done, E3 would not meet it and if the second is done, M1 would no longer be consistent with the empirical criterion. The most that can be said is that the arguments supporting this theory of evidence and the adequacy of these two criteria are not sound.

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